Purchase of Own Shares By Corporation Fund Available by Kennedy, Roger D.
LAW JOURNAL - DECEMBER, 1941
liable under the second. If the directors were liable for such pay-
ments, the stockholders would receive the benefit of their liability
by having the surplus available for dividends restored to the former
amount, and thereby have an additional source of funds for future
dividends.
While a dividends out of other than earned surplus without notice
to the stockholders, comes under a literal interpretation of the di-
rectors' liability under sec. 8623 -I2 3 b, yet because of the difference
in interests protected, it would seem that the directors should not be
liable under that section for failure to give notice as provided in
sec. 8625-38 (paragraphs d and e).
F. F. V.
PURCHASE OF OWN SHARES- BY CORPORATION-
FUND AVAILABLE
Proceeding under Ohio G. C. Sec. 8623-14, the defendant cor-
poration, by a two-thirds vote of its shareholders, amended its articles
of incorporation so as to relieve it from the obligation of maintain-
ing a sinking fund for the redemption of preferred shares. Plain-
tiffs, minority shareholders who had voted their shares against the
amendment, took advantage of the "appraisal statute," Sec. 8623-72,
and demanded that the corporation pay them the "full cash value"
for their shares. The corporation refused to pay the price asked,
and made a counter offer. Rejecting this, plaintiffs brought suit
in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County to determine the
fair cash value and secure a judgment against the corporation. The
court suitained a motion to dismiss for failure of proof. Plaintiffs
appealed, and following the Court of Appeals order reversing the
0 It may be argued that the corporation is the stockholders and that therefore the
same interest is being protected by both sections of the act. But the interest of the
stockholders as an aggregate may well be different from the interest of the individual
stockholder. As for example, if dividends out of other than earned surplus are paid to
preferred stockholders, does failure to give notice to the preferred stockholders injure
the common stockholders when if notice were given to the preferred, the common stock-
holders would not have cause to complain even though he was kept in ignorance of the
payment? If the preferred stock has preference on dissolution, the preference is the full
definition of the preferred stock's rights, and precludes the preferred from sharing in
the surplus available after payment of par on the preferred and common. Williams
v. Renshaw,220 App. Div. 39, 220 N. Y. S. 532 (1927); Murphy v. Richardson Dry
Goods Co., 326 Mo. 1, 31 S. W. (2d) 72 (1930). The preferred stockholder therefore
does not have the interest in keeping the capital surplus intact that the common stock-
holders would, and yet in our example the notice if given of the payment out of capital
surplus would be to him. The notice seems therefore not for the protection of the ag-
gregate of the stockholders, but only for the stockholder in his individual capacity.
100
NOTES 101
judgment of the trial court and remanding the cause, the defendant
sought a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the
Ohio State Supreme Court. In affirming the order, the Supreme
Court held that "Sec. 8623-41 General Code, forbids the purchase
of shares from dissenting shareholders only when there is reason-
able ground for believing that such purchase would leave the cor-
poration with assets of less value than the aggregate of its liabilities
to creditors."
Sec. 8623-4i authorizes the purchase by a corporation of its
own shares in certain instances, and also prescribes definite limita-
tions on this power to purchase.2 It is unfortunate that this section
contains no clear statement as to the funds that may be used 'for
such purchases, as does Sec. 8623-38, in respect to dividends.3
Paragraph 2 of subdivision (9), Sec. 41, is a provision added by
the amendments to the General Corporation Act, effective July 24,
1939, to prohibit treasury shares from being considered as assets in
the determination of a surplus available for dividend payments,
stock purchases, or other distribution. In an article discussing the
1939 amendments, 4 Professor Lattin observed that under old Sec.
41 it was arguable that, except in the purchase of its own shares
tinder subdivision (c),1 shares could be purchased out of capital, as
I Wildvrmuth v. The Lorain Coal and Dock Co., 133 Ohio St. 1, 32 N. E. (2d) 413
(1941).
Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 8623-41 (all but rckvant provisions paraphrased)-A corporation
way purchase its owen shares: (1) When articles authorize redemption (2) To collect or
comprornise debt or unpaid subscription (3) For sale to employees under See. 8623-36
(4) From employes, under repurchase agreement (5) To eliminate fractional shares (6)
Where articles give corporation a preemptive right (7) From dissenting sharesholders
(S) "To th extent of the surplus of the aggregate of its assets over the aggregate of its
liabilitivs plus stated capital, when authorized by the affirmative vote of the holders of
two-thirds of each class of shares outstanding, regardless of limitations or restriction,
,,n the voting pov,. r of any such ciso, or if the articles so provide or permit, a greater
ur lessor proportion, not less than a majority, of the shares of such class, or by the board
of directors when authorized by the articles." (9) Paragraph 1: For the reduction of
stated capital; Paragraph 2: "In the dtermination of the excess of a corporation's
as-ets over its liabilities plus stated capital, for the purpose of declaring and paying a
dividend, purchasing its ovsn shares or making any other distribution to shareholders,
tr,-asury shares shall not be considered as an asset of the corporation." Paragraph 3: "A
corpration shall not purchase its own shares except as provided in this section, nor
%,hen there is reasonable ground for believing that the corporation is unable, or by such
purchase may be rendered unable, to satisfy its obligations and liabilities." Paragraph
4: Limitation on purchase of shares by a subsidiary.
I G. C. see. 8623-38 (a): "A corporation may declare dividends . . . out of the
exc -, of the aggregate of its assets .. . over the aggregate of its liabilities plus stated
capital."
4Lattin, Strcanliniag the Ohio Corporation-The r939 Amendments, (1940) 6 0. S.
L. J. 123, 135, 136.
Subdivision (c) is the only subdivision in the old statute that says anything about
purchasing out of a surplus from which a dividend might have been declared.
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in Massachusetts and Wisconsin." He went on to pose the question:
"Does the addition of this new paragraph have the effect of requir-
ing that in all cases of purchases authorized under Sec. 8623-41, the
stated capital must be considered as a liability to be deducted along
with other liabilities from the total assets ?" He concludes that from
the position of this new paragraph in the section, it seems reasonable
to believe that a purchase by a corporation of its own shares cannot
be made out of any fund short of a surplus as defined in subdivision
(8) of Sec. 41.
To pursue this argument a little further, what significance can
be attached to the position of subdivision (9), paragraph 2? Its
declared purpose is to prohibit treasury shares from being consid-
ered as assets in the determination of an excess available for divi-
dend payments, stock purchases, and other distributions to share-
holders, such excess to be "of assets over liabilities plus stated capi-
tal." It relates no more to the subject matter of subdivision (9),
paragraph i, than it does to that of the eight preceding subdivisions.
If its prohibition was meant to be observed solely when a purchase
is made under subdivision (8), as a gloss on that provision, then
why was it not included within the body of that subdivision? Why,
if that was the intention, was its language not consistent with that
of subdivision (8) and the term "surplus" used instead of "excess"?
And again, if it was to have such limited application in cases arising
under Sec. 4, why does it refer to dividend payments and other
distributions not taken care of by Sec. 41 ? Paragraph 2 is the only
indication in the whole General Corporation Act of a fund from
which stock purchases may be made. Paragraph 3 is the only other
provision limiting purchases, and it prescribes a condition the exist-
ence of which will warrant a prohibition of share purchases, but does
not point to a proper specific fund. Observance of the restriction
imposed by that provision will, of course, effectively guarantee the
maintenance of assets equivalent to obligations and liabilities, and
in that general sense, paragraph 3 does indicate a "fund." But it
may well be intended to cover situations such as where a corpora-
tion has an excess of assets over obligations and liabilities, including
stated capital, but the purchase of its own stock would seriously
impair its working capital.
0 In commenting on old subdivision (b) of Sec. 41 George S. Hills in 48 HAzv. L. Rev.
1334, 1371 note 63 states: "Provision should be made to facilitate claims by or against
the corporation, hut it does not seem advisable to authorize the acquisition of shares out
of stated capital for that purpose as permitted by ... Ohio see. 41 (b) . . ."
\ol"E,
The casual reader of Sec. 41 might perhaps notice the conflict
% hich is latent in a comparison of paragraphs 2 and 3 of subdivision
(9). An attorney for a corporation intending to take action under
,his section might well be put to considerable time and effort to
resolve the ambiguity which faulty draftsmanship has created.
In discussing See. 41 in the principal case7 the court gave no
consideration at all to this possible effect of subdivision (9), para-
graph 2. Nor was the argument raised by brief of counsel for the
corporation. '  Construing subdivision (9), paragraph 3 the court
said, "The last above-quoted paragraph . . . refers to insolvency:
that is, when there is reasonable ground for believing -that the cor-
poration will not have sufficient assets to pay its liabilities to cred-
itors, not shareholders." In other words, so long as a corporation
is solvent, i. e., has assets exceeding its liabilities not hibluding stated
capital, it may purchase shares of its own stock to the extent of that
excess, for any of the purposes set forth in (i) to (7), inclusive,
of Sec. 8623 -4 1.
As stated previously, paragraph 2 is in such a position that it
might reasonably be construed to be a prescription of the sole fund
out of which purchases under Sec. 41 can be made. The December
16, 1938, Report of the Ohio State Bar Association Committee on
Corporation Law, with respect to the proposed amendments, sheds
a different light on the meaning of this section, however., In the
tentative amended draft of Sec. 41 included in that report, subdi-
vision (8) was worded practically .the same as it now reads." This
provision followed: "Shares may be acquired either out of stated
capital or surplus under subdivisions (i) to (7), inclusive, of this
section. Purchases from surplus under subdivision (8) of this sec-
tion are not limited to purchases authorized by subdivisions (i) to
(7) inclusive of this section." The comment appended to this ten-
tative draft stated that the principal proposed changes are: ". . . (4)
The inclusion of a provision to make it clear that purchases under
subdivisions (I) to (7) inclusive may be made out of stated capital
as well as out of surplus." This statement, in addition to supplying
an unequivocal answer to the question previously posed, indicates
138 Ohio St. 1, lo, 17, 32 N. E. (2d) 413, 420, 421 (1941).
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 28282.
9At pp. 39, 40.
"I Ibid. page 33. As there stated, subdivision (8) included a proviso (since deleted)
prohibitin.g tl.' purchase of stock -'ut -f a surplus created from retirement of treasury
share3.
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that the committee appreciated the need for such a clarification. In
its report of December 26, 1938, the committee made no mention,
either in the 'draft of Sec. 41 therein appearing," or in the appended
comments, of this proposed amendment. An attempt to explain the
omission would be but conjecture. Needless to say, the final draft
as passed by the legislature did not include such an illuminating
provision.
Prior to the advent of legislative controls on the power of a
corporation to purchase its own stock, the law of this country as to
the problem was unsettled. Ohio followed what must be considered
the minority rule, denying the existence of such a power in the
absence of specific statutory authority or special circumstances.
12
This view was based upon the ground that a corporation possessed
no powers except such as were conferred upon it by statute or neces-
sarily implied therefrom. However, courts were not adverse to
recognizing that such purchases would sometimes have to be made
to avoid a loss or to satisfy a debt due the corporation. 13  Later
authority can be found for the proposition that inasmuch as no
constitutional or statutory prohibition against such a power exists,
a purchase will not be set aside in -the absence of a showing of bad
faith and an injury to creditors. 4  The writer of the opinions in
these cases representing a departure from the Ohio rule were con-
sistent in their reluctance to discuss or point to a fund out of which
the consideration for the purchase could be drawn., But lack of a
judicial rule in regard to this problem does not explain the legisla-
ture's failure to include one, in view of the comprehensiveness of
the Ohio Act.
An inspection of the legislative restrictions imposed in other
states indicates -that the Ohio draftsmen were not alone guilty of
creating ambiguous provisions. Many of these statutes have the
effect of limiting stock purchases to instances where a "surplus"
" At pp. 41, 42.
12State ex rel Colburn v. The Oberlin Bldg. and Loan Assoc., 35 Ohio St. 258 (1S79):
Coppin v. Greenlees and Ransom Co., 38 0. S. 275, 43 Am. Rep. 425 (1882).
23Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 6 Ohio 177 (1833); Morgan v. Lewis, 46 0. S. 1, 17
N. E. 558 (1888); Merchant's National Bank v. Overman Carriage Co., 17 Ohio C. C.
253, 9 Ohio C. D. 738 (1898).
11 Siders v. The Gem City Concrete Co., 13 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 481, 23 Ohio C. D. 552
(1910); aff'd without opinion in 87 Ohio St. 519, 102 N. E. 1124 (1913).
2The opinion in the Siderr case, Supra Note 14, devoted some attention to the evi-
dence of the solvency of the corporation, but came to no conclusion as to a proper fund.
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exists.", The term "surplus" might well be taken to mean (a)
"earned surplus", that which has been earned through corporate
activity and not distributed as dividends or reserved for other pur-
poses; (b) "capital surplus", that which has arisen from the sale
of stock at a premium, from the acquisition of its own stock at less
than par value and from sale of capital assets at a sum greater
than their stated value; or (c) "paid-in surplus," a contribution
made by the purchasers over and above that part of the purchase
price which must be entered on the books as capital.' Other statutes
prohibit purchases where such would cause "any impairment of
capital." 11 This indefinite phraseology was held by the Colorado
Supreme Court not to limit purchases to surplus funds.' Other
statutes speak of surpluses with more particularity. California
Civil Code, Sec. 342, limits purchases to earned surplus except in
certain instances; Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Sec. 7492-
21, makes provision for purchases out of paid-in surplus and earned
surplus, provided that if there be outstanding shares entitled to
preferential dividends or to a preference on liquidation, then "only
such shares shall be purchased or redeemed out of paid-in surplus.;"
Illinois limits purchases to earned surplus, but the limitations do not
apply when the purpose of the acquisition is to eliminate fractional
shares, collect or compromise a debt, buy shares of dissenters or re-
deem shares as otherwise permitted by the act.20
IN. Y. PENAL LAw., (lndvr, 1929), Sec. 664-(5) imposing criminal liability on
corporate officura responsible for purchase of stock out of anything but a surplus; ILL.
ANN. STT. (S'ITu HurD, 1935). Chap. 32, Sec. 157-6; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (DART.
1932) S.c. 1113; TENN. CODE ANN. (WILLIAMS, 1934) Sec. 3722 (9); W. VA. CODE
(0IC,11 L, 1932) Sc.. 3051; FLA. Comp. GEN. LAWs (1927) Sec. 6534 (3).
" See )3rLr A',D MEANS, TEE .IoDERN CORPORATION KD PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) at
1,,2. BALLANT I:.L AND LATT N, CASES A.ND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (1939), note at
452; alzo Horowitz and Cood, May A Corporation Purchase Its Own Stock Out of
Cal 't I: The P;-bVm R,-visitcd, (1938) 27 GEORGETOWN L. Jour. 217.
"COLO. SAT. Ar,:'. (1935) Chap. 41, Sec. 24; RHODE ISLAND GEN. LAws (1938) Chap
116, Art. I, See. 5 (g); Dr.L. REV. CODE (1935) Corporations, Art. 1, See. 19; MicH. STAT.
Ar: .. (1935) S-c. 21.10; NEV. Cone. LAwS (HILLY.EP, 1929), Sec. 1603 (3); IND. STAT.
". (vy:; s, 1933) Sec. 25.202.
5 Colorado Industrial Loan and Investment Co. v. Clem, 82 Colo. 399, 260 Pac. 1019
41927).
'ILLINOIS A:;: . STAT. (SMITH HuRo, 1935) Sec. 157.6: "A corporation, shall have
pox r to purcha c its own hares . . . provided it shall not purchase . . . when net assets
,ire less than the sum of its -:tated capital, its paid in surprus, and (capital) surplus . . .
or w.hen by so doing its net assts would be reduced below such sum."
See Hills, Model Ctrporatiou Act, (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1370, 1371, 1372.
Mr. Hills regards earned surplus as the "most suitable and least restricted fund avail-
able for acquisition of shar~s", but recognizes that to give the rights of dissenters any
practical value, purchases from such shareholders should not be restricted to such a surplus.
Also see Levy, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Shares, (1930) 15 Minn. L.
Rev. 1, 37. and note at 20.
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Paradoxically, the Uniform Business Corporation Act contains
no provision in regard to this problem.
By the doctrine prevailing in Massachusetts and Wisconsin, in
the absence of express statutory restrictions, corporations may pur-
chase their own shares in good faith out of capital, provided this is
done without prejudice to rights of existing creditors or discrimina-
tion against other shareholders.2 ' Seemingly, the decision of the
Wildermuth case is in accord with this general policy, and com-
pletes the anomolous metamorphosis through which the Ohio law
has passed. Time forbids a discussion of the merits of this policy.
Suffice it is to say that it has been "viewed with alarm" by a goodly
number of critics, the principal objection being that it constitutes
a withdrawal of assets in favor of the selling shareholder to the
possible serious prejudice of creditors and remaining shareholders."
R. D. K.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
MAINTENANCE OF A BASTARD CHILD - INTERPRETATION
OF OHIO GENERAL CODE, SECTION 12123
The Probate Court adjudged the defendant the putatiVe father
of a bastard child and ordered him to pay a reasonable sum for its
support an maintenance, such weekly payments to begin at the date
of adjudication. From this judgment the mother appealed to the
Court of Appeals, contending that the weekly payments should begin
at the date of birth of the child, some ninetetn months prior to the
date of adjudication. Held: Affirmed. The judgment given was
the only one permissible under a strict interpretation of section
12123, Ohio G. C. One judge dissented.- State ex rel Griffin v.
Zimmerman, 67 Ohio App. 272, 21 Ohio 0. 253 (i94I).
A review of the development of the Bastardy Act is necessary
"Barrett v. W. A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N. E. 765 (1931);
Scriggins v. Thomas Dolby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N. E. 749 (1935); Spiegel v. Beacon
Participations Inc. et a!, 297 Mass. 398, 8 N. E. (2d) 895 (1937); Koepler v. Crocker
Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 228 N. V. 130 (1930); Rasmussen v. Schweizer, 194 Wis. 362,
216 N. V. 481 (1927); also see Grace Securities Cori. v. Roberts, 138 Va. 792, 164 S. E.
700 (1932). C. F. Boggs v. Fleming, 66 Fed. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 1933).
=See Nussbaum, Acquisition by a CorporatioA of Its Own Stock, (1935) 35 COL. L.
Rev. 911; Levy, Purchase by an English Company of Its Shares. (1930) 79 U. PA. L.
Rav. 43; WAREz, Progress of the Law: Corporations, (1921) 34 HARV. L. RZv. 282. 293;
Levy, op. cit. supra, note 20.
'Crow, J., dissented.
